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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates effects of interpersonal links with bureaucrats on SME access to 
formal finance. A survey of 502 SMEs in post-communist Uzbekistan shows fewer SMEs with 
government connections express a need for external finance, but success rates of 
applications are higher than for SMEs without connections. Econometric models show 
government-connected SMEs receive more formal credit than their counterparts. The small 
share of SME credit available is thus distributed in favour of those capitalising on 
bureaucratic links, with consequent resource misallocation. Findings imply that greater SME 
credit flows need supplementing with capacity building that improves bank transparency and 
efficiency. 
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1. Introduction 
From a position of broad similarity in the late 1980s, financial sector development of 
transition economies in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (FSU) has become 
remarkably divergent. Whereas financial development in Eastern Europe has improved 
significantly, slow-reformer economies of the FSU such as Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, 
Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan remain 
financially underdeveloped, even by the standards of most other transition economies 
(Honohan, 2006). Similarly, and unlike in most Eastern European countries (Kornai, 2000), 
political reform in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) has either been 
incomplete (e.g. Russia and Kazakhstan) or superficial (e.g. Belarus, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan), and mostly benefits the ruling elite. 
Dasgupta (2005; 2009) and Rose (2001) argue that when anonymous market relations are 
not mature and bureaucratic institutions are dysfunctional and lack credibility, rent-seeking 
behaviour becomes prevalent in society, extending well beyond the level of the political elite 
as ordinary agents also try to profit from a web of interpersonal relations. In particular, low-
ranking government and bank officials will use their impersonal positions for personal gain. 
Since interpersonal networks are not inclusive, decisions about access to resources can lead 
to misallocation. Building on this broad argument, our empirical study of Uzbekistan 
investigates whether interpersonal connections with government officials, among other 
potential factors, improve SME access to formal finance. 
Uzbekistan, in common with other FSU countries, undertook a wide range of trade, price 
liberalisation and small-scale privatisation reforms after independence in 1991. However, the 
process stalled in the late 1990s, and has not so far extended to large-scale enterprises or to 
the banking sector; the latter is still currently dominated by state-owned banks. Political 
reforms have made even less progress. The ruling elite of the late 1980s has remained 
unchanged and unchallenged.  
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As previous empirical studies suggest (La Porta et al., 2002; Faccio, 2006; Faccio et al., 2006), 
under these circumstances formal sector lending decisions are likely to be influenced by 
political, rather than economic, factors, and mainly benefit larger enterprises. For SMEs, 
however, the situation is less clear: for them, particularly, bank credit is one of the most 
important sources of external finance. Consequently, a survey of SMEs from three regions in 
Uzbekistan has been conducted to assess the influence of various factors on their access to 
formal credit. 
The study is organised as follows. The next section briefly reviews and discusses relevant 
literature. The following section provides some contextual information about reforms in 
Uzbekistan’s banking and enterprise sectors, and also highlights country-specific problems in 
the financial sector, particularly those affecting payment systems. Section 4 describes the 
data used in this study and presents summary statistics and other stylised facts that emerge 
from the survey. Section 5 presents the estimation results and main findings, and a 
discussion and conclusions are provided in Section 6. 
2. Institutions, Interpersonal Connections, Organisational Failure, and Access to 
Formal Finance 
 
The role and importance of institutions in promoting economic growth is widely recognised 
(North, 1990, p.3): by creating incentive mechanisms in human exchange, they shape 
economic outcomes. Recent empirical studies show that long-run per-capita income 
differences across developed and developing countries can be explained in terms of the type, 
and quality, of economic institutions: better protection of private property rights encourages 
investment in human and physical capital (Hall and Jones, 1999; Acemoglu et al., 2005). 
While it is difficult to precisely define and successfully design appropriate and effective pro-
growth institutions (as recent, and still ongoing, economic transformation in post-communist 
economies shows), it is also widely accepted that, in market economies, financial 
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development is closely correlated with economic growth (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 
1998; Levine, 2005). The strength of this correlation depends on underlying institutional 
differences, such as the effectiveness of contract enforcements and creditor protection laws 
(La Porta et al., 1998).  
Earlier studies in this area have focused mostly on aggregate size or ‘depth’ of the financial 
system rather than on its breadth (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2008), with the resulting 
tendency to treat the aggregate measures of financial depth as equivalent to the quality of 
financial development. In fact, breadth and outreach, as well as depth, determine the quality 
of the financial system. While more developed financial systems generally offer better access 
to financial services, this is not always the case (Claessens, 2006); commonly used 
quantitative aggregate measures of financial deepening (such as broad money, private sector 
credits, or banking sector assets) provide insufficient information about breadth and quality, 
and, for example, neglect the proportion of economically active entities responsible for 
utilisation of available financial services. Only more recently has research attention shifted 
towards questions of financial access and financial inclusion, in terms of how easily firms and 
households can take advantage of available formal financial services (Beck and Demirguc-
Kunt, 2008, p. 383). While studies of this additional dimension have proliferated in a short 
period of time (Ayyagari et al., 2008; Beck et al., 2005; Beck et al., 2008 among others), there 
are few country-level case-studies or cross-country comparisons. 
Financial services access is lower in developing countries. In developed countries, more than 
90% of households have access at least to some financial services, but this falls to less than 
20% in most of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), exceptions being resource-
rich Russia and Kazakhstan (Honohan, 2006). Similarly, enterprise complaints about poor 
financial access are higher in developing countries; almost one-third cite lack of external 
finance as either the main or a severe obstacle to their operation (Claessens, 2006). 
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Unequal access to finance affects growth, because some profitable entrepreneurial 
initiatives may never come to fruition, while others which fail to raise external finance will 
operate at sub-optimal levels, despite having high capital productivity (Claessens and Perotti, 
2007, p.573). Lack of access to external finance may also potentially inhibit human and 
physical capital accumulation (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2008, p.384). Although informal 
credit institutions expand and contract ‘contracyclically to repression and liberalization of 
formal finance’ (Chandavarkar, 1992, p.135), they tend to offer only short-term, high-cost 
loans (Christensen, 1993) and thus are far from perfect substitutes for formal institutions 
and, in the context of transition economies, usually concentrate on particular sectors of the 
economy with rapid turnover, such as trade and services industries in urban areas (Ruziev 
and Midmore, 2014). Moreover, evidence shows that financing from formal, rather than 
informal, financial institutions is associated with faster firm growth (Ayyagari et al., 2008). 
Studies also show that financial development helps enterprises to overcome liquidity 
constraints and improve their growth potential (Levine, 2005; Love, 2003; Demirguc-Kunt 
and Maksimovic, 1998). There is further evidence that smaller enterprises benefit more from 
the improved availability of formal finance (Beck et al., 2005; Beck et al., 2008).  
Poor access to financial services in developing countries may be due to high fixed costs 
associated with the provision of financial services and tight entry regulations (Claessens and 
Perotti, 2007). Also, countries with low incomes will lack a sufficiently large pool of domestic 
savings to be efficiently mobilised to meet the enterprises’ demands for external finance 
(Gupta, 1987). However, the persistence of the problem over a longer run can also be 
explained by political factors: reforms changing the status quo could also challenge the 
ability of the incumbent elite to extract rents, and as a result no fundamental reforms will be 
undertaken (Acemoglu et al., 2005). 
Because economic institutions, alongside political factors, matter in the economic process, 
business environments will differ across countries. This difference is not simply due to levels 
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of development, however, but also to the variety of institutions and associated country-
specific constraints and incentive mechanisms which result from differences in the form, 
pace, and depth of reforms implemented, themselves possible outcomes of decisions by 
ruling elites. Considerable evidence suggests that political connections play an important role 
in gaining access to formal finance, and that larger enterprises gain more benefit from such 
connections (La Porta et al., 2002; Faccio, 2006; and Faccio et al., 2006). Nevertheless, 
capturing most country-specific issues in large cross-country studies remains ‘challenging in 
terms of attribution of causes and effects’, and consequently ‘evidence from case studies 
highlighting the impact of entrenched elites over institutional environment’ (Claessens and 
Perotti, 2007, p.761) is desirable. 
Political factors can affect economic outcomes formally, through rules and regulations, and 
informally, through individual political connections and interpersonal relations. For example, 
entrenched elites may influence institutional environments by adopting formal rules and 
regulations to protect their rent-seeking interests; at the same time, this may create 
unfavourable constraints and obstacles for the operation of smaller businesses. As a 
corollary, increasing bureaucracy will reinforce a culture of favouritism and bribery, 
suppressing efficient market-based impersonal exchange and resource allocation, and 
hindering aggregate economic performance (Fedderke et al., 1999, p.734).  
In such less than effective market conditions, a thick network of exclusive interpersonal 
relations will emerge to resolve allocative and redistributive questions, including access to 
formal finance. Social capital, in the form of a collection of networks and an aggregation of 
reputations, will grow in importance in production and exchange relations (Stiglitz, 2001, 
p.64).1 The complex and dynamic notion of social capital changes with the level of economic 
development (Stiglitz, 2001): in thin and underdeveloped markets and where the state lacks 
in credibility, it is mostly represented through community-based and community-ruled 
horizontal webs of interpersonal networks. As the market-based exchange system develops 
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and deepens, informal communitarian institutions decline in importance and are replaced by 
formal contracts embedded in impersonal legal systems. However, rather than the stock of 
social capital shrinking, this transformation indicates a restructuring and a deepening, albeit 
in broader sense (Stiglitz, 2001, p.65). 
Interpersonal networks can be considered as an asset, and as such, can be put to creative or 
destructive use, or even be left unused. Some interpersonal networks always exist but may 
remain inactive. However, agents will resort to their use more frequently, and also form new 
interpersonal networks, when impersonal markets are suppressed or weak, rent seeking 
behaviour is prevalent, and rules and laws are dysfunctional (Dasgupta, 2005).   
All modern societies use a mix of impersonal markets, bureaucratic organisations, and 
communitarian institutions which depend upon interpersonal networks (Dasgupta, 2005). 
Indeed, market-based economic systems are characterised by anonymous markets and 
impersonal public and private bureaucratic organisations which operate under the rule of 
law (Weber, 1968). But, after more than twenty years of transition, most post-communist 
economies of the FSU, including Uzbekistan, have yet to achieve this stage of development. 
Rose (2001) characterises these economies as suffering from an organisational failure: whilst 
over the years, market-based exchanges have intensified and formal bureaucratic 
organisations have gained importance, the latter still fail to operate impartially or 
predictably, or according to legal prescription. Public officials and civil servants in otherwise 
impersonal bureaucratic organisations personalise their positions by using the rigidity of 
rules and regulations as an excuse for rent-seeking. As a result, individuals lose incentives to 
use prices, rules and regulations as signals; to realize their projects, they resort to variety of 
interpersonal networks to personalise relationships with impersonal bureaucrats, leading to 
misallocation of resources (Rose, 2001). 
Some individuals are fortunate, and inherit or establish economically beneficial networks of 
personal connections, while others have connections which, albeit of emotional value, are 
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economically insignificant. Because interpersonal networks are exclusive, a small number of 
strategically well-connected individuals can often seize a disproportionately large share of 
common resources and opportunities (McKean, 1992). Large anonymous market-based 
exchange systems are more efficient than the interpersonal networks because “the best” 
buyer or seller may not be a part of exclusive networks (Serageldin and Grootaert, 2001, 
p.53). In this particular example of access to formal credit, the implication is that society will 
fail to allocate one of its scarce resources to its most productive use, as a result experiencing 
allocative inefficiency. 
Our main, but simple, proxy variable for measuring the importance of such interpersonal 
network of connections in SMEs’ access to formal finance is government connections, which 
is defined as SMEs having government connections if their senior managers, and/or their 
friends and/or relatives have held, or still hold, a senior position with a government 
institution at any of the local, regional, and central government offices. Further details of this 
and other relevant variables will be discussed in detail in Sections 4 and 5. 
 
3. Recent Developments in Uzbekistan’s Banking Sector: A Background 
Uzbekistan’s initial market-oriented reforms from independence to the mid-1990s were 
relatively speedy and comprehensive (Pomfret, 2010). Privatisation of small-scale enterprises 
was fast and successful, and the privatisation process began to be extended to large 
enterprises: private sector share in GDP rose from almost zero before transition to 45% by 
1997. Nevertheless, progress stalled after the late 1990s and, even after more than 20 years 
of transition, state control remains over key sectors of the economy. 
According the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD, 2011), no change 
has occurred in Uzbekistan's reform indices2 for banking, enterprise, and large scale 
privatisation respectively since the 2000s. In the banking sector, liberalisation policies for 
credit allocation, soft credits, and interest ceilings are stalled; enforcement of bankruptcy 
Connectedness and SME financing in post-communist economies: evidence from Uzbekistan 
Kobil Ruziev and Peter Midmore 
9 
 
legislation remains weak and administrative methods of corporate governance have not fully 
been abolished in the enterprise sector (EBRD, 2011). More generally, Uzbekistan’s transition 
economy counterparts have left it behind in transforming banking, as well as enterprise 
sectors, as shown in Figures 1 and 2. 
 
 
 
 
The ratio of bank assets to GDP has remained large in relation to the ratio of broad money to 
GDP (see Figure 3). One possible explanation is that Uzbekistan resorted to external finance 
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Figure 1. EBRD's Banking Sector Reforms and Small Scale 
Privatisation Indices for TEs in 2010. 
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Figure 2. EBRD's Banking Sector Reform and Enterprise Restructuring 
Indices for TEs in 2010. 
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for investment projects in the 1990s, especially in the energy sector, and borrowed well over 
US$5 billion, equivalent to more than 55% of GDP (World Bank, 2003). Most of these loans 
were attracted by large state-owned banks under sovereign guarantee. However, 
international reserves grew from around US$1 billion in 2000 to over US$11 billion in 2009, 
arising from consistent trade surpluses and large remittance inflows. Consequently, as the 
ratio of external debt to GDP declined, so did the ratio of bank assets to GDP. 
 
An alternative account identifies the continuation of the old-style directed credit, and 
highlights attempts to deal with its impact on excessive credit growth and hence inflation 
(Akimov and Dollery, 2009). While a generous credit policy helped prevent unemployment 
and output losses, its consequence was an excess supply of bank credit (non-cash money) in 
the economy, a key systematic problem for the banking sector (EBRD, 2003, p.212). 
Monetary authorities dealt with this problem through command-economy style restrictions 
on free convertibility between cash money and non-cash money.3 Such payments system 
problems remain an issue for the smooth operation and growth of enterprises, as the next 
section shows. 
To mitigate the impact of the global financial crisis and economic recession on the domestic 
economy, significant liquidity was injected into the capital base of the largest state-owned 
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Figure 3. Selected Financial Sector Indicators in Uzbekistan. 
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banks. This helped increase banking sector capital by around 40% each year in 2008-10, and 
also supported annual bank credit supply growth to economy at more than 30% during this 
period (CBU, 2012). 
Nevertheless, with relatively small sizes of monetisation and bank intermediation (compared 
to the size of the economy), state control of the banking sector and most large-scale 
enterprises, and persistent payments system problems associated with operating business 
accounts with banks, prospects for access to formal credit by SMEs do not appear 
encouraging. On their own, however, these general indicators do not provide any insight into 
important questions such as whether or not all SMEs have equal access to bank credit, and 
the major influences affecting their use of formal finance. These issues will be discussed in 
more depth in the next two sections. 
4. Data Used in the Study and Their Preliminary Analysis 
The primary data used in this study is a sample of 502 SMEs which comes from three 
different regions in Uzbekistan. The detailed discussion of the data source and the method of 
construction can be found in Appendix 1.  
Summary statistics of the main variables used in the study are presented in Table 1; Table 2 
shows the same set of variables distinguished by the existence or otherwise of government 
connections (regarded as an indicator of senior SME managers’ interpersonal connections 
with government officials), and also test whether or not the simple sub-sample means are 
statistically different under a two-tailed t-test. 
As can be seen in Table 1, the average age of SME heads in the sample is approximately 43 
years with the standard deviation (s.d.) of 11 years, implying SMEs are mostly governed by 
middle aged individuals. The average value of SME heads’ education, reflecting their human 
capital, is over 17 years with an s.d. of 3 years, which implies that most SME heads in the 
sample have a higher education degree. SME management is dominated by males, as female 
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SME heads constituted only 17% of the sample.4 As for the age of SMEs, which can be 
interpreted as business experience, the sample is dominated by relatively young SMEs: the 
average age of SMEs is around 8 years. 
Further relevant information about some of the other important variables is presented in 
Figures 4-6. Enterprises usually face a variety of obstacles outside their control that hinder 
their smooth operation and growth; accessibility of appropriately-priced external finance is 
only one of them. Figure 4 ranks respondents’ subjective assessment of the severity of 
obstacles which hamper their operation and growth, focusing only on “very important” and 
“important” answers as a percentage of total responses (other possible responses were 
“slightly important”, “of little importance”, “not important”, and “not a problem”). Key 
obstacles relevant to financial sector development are highlighted in a darker colour, and 
thus around 33% and 59% of sampled enterprises indicated that the external finance 
constraint and the payments system problems respectively were “important” or “very 
important” obstacles, the latter reinforcing previous discussion of payment system problems 
as a major country-specific commercial difficulty in Uzbekistan. Respondents’ subjective 
evaluation of their access to bank credit, in the scale of 1 (very easy) to 5 (very difficult), is 
reported in Figure 5: those describing access to formal finance “difficult” or “very difficult” 
constituted more than half of the respondents. 
Entrepreneurs require external finance, both formal and informal, for variety of purposes 
including business start-ups, working capital needs, fixed capital formation, and possibly 
even for debt financing. However, formal credit institutions such as banks mostly provide 
loans to well-established SMEs for specific working capital and investment purposes. Table 3 
provides general information on the proportion of SMEs within the sample which, 
respectively, invested in business expansion, expressed a need for external finance, applied 
for formal credit, and obtained formal credit. As can be seen from the second and third  
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columns, 70% of the SMEs in the sample invested in the expansion of their business since 
their inception (or privatisation if they were former SOEs); 53% of respondents indicated a  
need for external finance; around 37% applied for formal finance; and less than 21% had 
actually obtained formal bank credit during the last five years, a comparatively small 
proportion relative to the average ratio of 34% over 30 countries in the World Bank and 
EBRD Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey in 2005 (Muravyev et al., 
2009, p. 275). 
SMEs which did not apply for formal finance were asked to identify reasons for their self-
exclusion from the formal credit market; the main responses were sufficient internal finance 
(33%), loan costs (23%), loan agreement terms and collateral requirements (21% combined), 
and complexity of the application process (15%). Additionally, SMEs which applied 
Table 2. Summary statistics of Main Variables by Government Connections  
  
SMEs without Government 
Connections 
SMEs with Government 
Connections 
Difference between 
the Means 
Variables μN σN NN μG σG NG μN - μG 
frmfin_main 0.19 0.39 382 0.29 0.46 106 -0.10** 
Age 42.61 10.96 386 43.35 11.38 106 31.65 
age22 19.35 9.66 386 20.01 10.23 106 -0.66 
bsness_exper 7.61 9.66 384 10.45 15.96 105 -2.84** 
bsness_exper22 1.51 4.90 384 3.62 12.47 105 -2.11*** 
Educ 17.08 2.96 384 17.22 3.02 106 -0.14 
Lnsales 15.35 1.85 307 15.61 1.84 95 -0.26 
expnd_d 0.59 0.49 332 0.63 0.49 98 -0.04 
cash1 0.67 0.47 386 0.64 0.48 106 0.03 
Gender 0.18 0.39 386 0.13 0.34 106 0.05 
tash 0.65 0.48 386 0.40 0.49 106 0.25*** 
tash_obl 0.18 0.38 386 0.30 0.46 106 -0.12*** 
fergh 0.18 0.38 386 0.30 0.46 106 -0.12*** 
indust 0.40 0.50 386 0.41 0.49 106 -0.01 
agri 0.09 0.29 386 0.14 0.35 106 -0.05 
srvs 0.30 0.46 386 0.31 0.47 106 -0.01 
trd 0.22 0.41 386 0.14 0.35 106 0.08* 
needcr_main 0.54 0.50 386 0.51 0.50 106 0.03 
invstd 0.67 0.47 386 0.80 0.40 106 -0.13*** 
crdappl1 0.35 0.48 386 0.46 0.50 106 -0.11** 
bribe 0.33 0.47 346 0.34 0.48 99 -0.01 
bzinbrpl 0.78 0.41 386 0.73 0.45 106 0.05 
Note: μ refers to mean and σ to standard deviation; N is the number of observations. *** refers to 1%, ** to 
5% and * to 10% level of significance in two-tailed t-test. 
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unsuccessfully for formal finance were asked for their opinion of why their applications 
failed. Figure 6 indicates that the most important reason for rejection (over 35% of 
responses) was unsuitability of their collateral for formal credit institutions, which is a 
classical problem (Chandavarkar, 1992; Christensen, 1993). 
 
 
 
 
 
59.0% 
53.6% 
37.3% 
33.5% 
32.5% 
29.9% 
29.9% 
21.7% 
16.9% 
0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0% 50.0% 60.0% 70.0%
Payments system problems
High tax rates
Low demand for products
Obtaining various permits
External finance
Bureaucracy and bribery
Energy shortages
Underdeveloped infrastructure
Forced contributions to social projects
Figure 4. Major Obstacles to Enterprises' Operation and Growth  
("Important" and "Very Important" Responses Only out of 502 Responses). 
2.8% 
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32.4% 
20.7% 
0.0%
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35.0%
Very easy Easy Not easy Difficult Very
difficult
Figure 5. Enterprises' Subjective Evaluation of Their 
Access to Bank Credit (460 Responses). 
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Entrepreneurs require external finance, both formal and informal, for variety of purposes 
including business start-ups, working capital needs, fixed capital formation, and possibly 
even for debt financing. However, formal credit institutions such as banks mostly provide 
loans to well-established SMEs for specific working capital and investment purposes. Table 3 
provides general information on the proportion of SMEs within the sample which, 
respectively, invested in business expansion, expressed a need for external finance, applied 
for formal credit, and obtained formal credit. As can be seen from the second and third 
columns, 70% of the SMEs in the sample invested in the expansion of their business since 
their inception (or privatisation if they were former SOEs); 53% of respondents indicated a 
need for external finance; around 37% applied for formal finance; and less than 21% had 
actually obtained formal bank credit during the last five years, a comparatively small 
proportion relative to the average ratio of 34% over 30 countries in the World Bank and 
EBRD Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey in 2005 (Muravyev et al., 
2009, p. 275). 
SMEs which did not apply for formal finance were asked to identify reasons for their self-
exclusion from the formal credit market; the main responses were sufficient internal finance 
(33%), loan costs (23%), loan agreement terms and collateral requirements (21% combined), 
and complexity of the application process (15%). Additionally, SMEs which applied 
unsuccessfully for formal finance were asked for their opinion of why their applications 
failed. Figure 6 indicates that the most important reason for rejection (over 35% of 
responses) was unsuitability of their collateral for formal credit institutions, which is a 
classical problem (Chandavarkar, 1992; Christensen, 1993). 
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Nevertheless, use of formal credit is not the same as access to formal credit. Access is a 
broader term referring to the availability of a reasonable quantity of formal finance at 
reasonable costs (Claessens, 2006, pp.210-11); it covers both existing users of formal credit 
as well as those who voluntarily exclude themselves for variety of reasons including assumed 
rejection, self-sufficiency of internal funds, and possibly even lack of awareness. In this 
sense, additional information provided in the fourth column of Table 3 can be useful in 
depicting a clearer picture of SMEs’ access to formal finance. Approximately three-quarters 
of SMEs which had invested in business expansion since their start-up expressed a need for 
external finance. Of these around 70% applied for formal finance, which in this study just 
comprises bank credits – the predominant source of external finance for small enterprises 
(Berger and Udell, 1998). Most importantly, conditional upon applying for bank credit, more 
than half of the SMEs successfully received formal credit, indicating that access to formal 
credit is actually greater than suggested by the low ratio of SMEs with credit use in the 
overall sample. 
13.2% 
3.3% 
6.6% 
7.7% 
8.8% 
11.0% 
14.3% 
35.2% 
0.0% 10.0% 20.0% 30.0% 40.0%
Various other reasons
Lack resources to pay the required…
Lender did not have funds at the time
Lack connections in the formal credit sector
Business plan was not acceptable to lender
Small scope of business
Our collateral was not suitable for lender
Figure 6. Main Reasons for Rejection of Application  
(99 responses, multiple responses possible). 
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While this preliminary analysis provides some insight into SME financial constraints, other 
issues remain unresolved. For example, some SMEs which do not require bank credit may 
still apply for and even obtain it (due, for example, to the existence of interpersonal 
relations, asymmetric information and adverse selection problems). 
Table 3 also divides information on these variables for SMEs with and without government 
connections. Simple comparison between results for these two sub-samples shows that, 
conditional upon undertaking business expansion, the proportion of SMEs requiring external 
finance is higher for enterprises without government connections than their counterparts. 
However, and more importantly, of the enterprises requiring external finance, more SMEs 
with government connections applied for formal credit than those without government 
connections; furthermore, conditional upon applying for formal credit, the success rate is 
also rather higher for SMEs with government connections than that for those without. On 
average, a larger proportion of SMEs with government connections obtained bank credit 
(29%) than those without government connections (19%), whereas a smaller proportion of 
the former group (67%) carried out business expansion since their inception, compared to 
that of the latter group (80%). In both cases, the differences in the means are statistically 
significant at less than 5% level in a two-sided t-test (see Table 2). An important caveat, 
however, is that not all government connections are equal and that having connections at 
the highest level would result in more access to resource opportunities. Nevertheless, our 
assumption (also consistent with evidence found elsewhere: Faccio, 2006; Faccio et al., 2006) 
is that the established political elite in Uzbekistan is more likely to be linked with large 
enterprises, having turnovers in excess of millions of dollars and employing thousands of 
people. This, combined with the fact that majority of the SMEs in our sample employ less 
than 25 people, implies that we are dealing with a 'second tier' of connectedness which can 
be treated as relatively equal. 
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5. Do Interpersonal Relations Matter in Gaining Access to Formal Finance? Estimation 
Results and Main Findings 
While only a fifth of sampled enterprises obtained formal credit, a relatively high proportion 
of credit applicants were successful. In the context of weak financial sector development and 
poor enterprise sector reforms in Uzbekistan, the determinants of access to formal finance 
thus become a focus of interest. In particular, we wish to understand whether or not 
interpersonal relations play statistically significant role in improving SME access to formal 
finance. 
The basic econometric equation used to estimate various dichotomous models related to 
formal credit use in this study can be expressed as follows: 
Yi = α + Xiβ + Ziγ + εi  (1) 
where Y is a binary dependent variable that takes the value of 1 for success and 0 otherwise. 
X and Z are vectors of predictors that affect the probability of success, the former including 
both continuous and categorical control variables such as entrepreneurs’ age, business 
experience, education, gender, regions, sectors, and payment system problems, while latter 
comprises three proxy variables for interpersonal networks, namely gov_connect, bribe, and 
bzinbrpl; α, β, and γ are parameters to be estimated, and ε is the random error term. The 
logit maximum likelihood approach is used. 
Estimation results of equation (1) for the model of credit use are reported in Table 4. The 
complete list of predictors and their expected signs are presented in the first two columns of 
the table respectively; brief descriptions of the variables can be found in Table 1. The 
variables age and bsness_exper can be used as proxies for human capital and entrepreneurial 
ability respectively. While they are expected to have a positive impact on the probability of 
obtaining formal credit, their impact is expected to diminish as the values of the variables 
increase. Hence a squared term, with an expected negative sign, is also included for both 
variables. The underlying rationale is that life and business experience will make 
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entrepreneurs appreciate the importance of using their input resources, including external 
finance, more efficiently. Moreover, from the lenders’ perspective, longer established 
enterprises may have better reputations, credit histories, and possibly longer-term 
relationships with formal credit institutions (Cavaluzzo and Cavaluzzo, 1998, p. 779). The 
coefficient of the variable, educ, a proxy for business owners’ human capital as well as 
personal wealth, is also expected to have a positive sign. The variable lnsales is a proxy for 
enterprise size (Cavaluzzo and Cavaluzzo, 1998, p.779): larger enterprises are expected to 
have higher sales revenues. Intuitively, we would expect the estimated parameter of this 
variable to have a positive sign on the basis that formal credit organisations prefer lending to 
larger SMEs due to the higher transaction costs associated with monitoring a large number 
of small loans. The dummy variable expnd_d refers to an increase in sales revenues 
compared to the previous year and its coefficient is also expected to be positive. The next 
variable is cash1 represents reported payment system problems, which was noted in Section 
3 as one of the key country-specific business environment constraints in Uzbekistan. If SMEs 
identify payment system problems as a major constraint for smooth operation and growth of 
their businesses, they would be expected also to have a lower chance of obtaining formal 
credit. 
The next variable is gender. A cross-country empirical study by Muravyev et al. (2009) found 
that, compared to male-managed companies, female-managed companies were less likely to 
get formal credit; hence, the coefficient of this variable is expected to have a negative sign. 
Regional dummy variables are used to reflect the higher per capita income level in Tashkent, 
the capital city and financial centre of the country. It is expected that SMEs operating in the 
other two regions, tash_obl being the Tashkent region and fergh being the Ferghana region, 
might have a slight disadvantage in obtaining formal credit. Sectoral dummies reflect the 
composition of the sample, but there is no a priori expectation of the sign of the coefficients 
of the variables for industry and construction, trade, services, and agriculture.  
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Table 4. Credit Use: Probability of Holding a Formal Credit 
 
 
Predictors 
 
Expected 
Sign 
(+/-) 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Logit 
Coeff. with 
S.E. 
Odds 
Ratio 
Logit 
Coeff. with 
S.E. 
Odds 
Ratio 
Logit 
Coeff. with 
S.E. 
Odds 
Ratio 
Constant  - 10.15*** 
(3.20) 
– - 8.09*    
(4.91) 
– - 6.54* 
(4.04) 
– 
Age 
 
age22 
+ 
 
- 
0.25**    
(0.13) 
- 0.28**   
(0.14) 
1.28 
 
0.75 
 
0.21   
(0.20) 
- 0.22 
(0.23) 
1.24 
 
0.80 
0.06 
(0.16) 
0.06 
(0.18) 
1.06 
 
0.94 
 
busness_exper 
 
busness_exper22 
+ 
 
- 
0.07**    
(0.03) 
- 0.11** 
(0.05) 
1.07 
 
0.90 
0.06 
(0.05) 
- 0.11 
(0.08) 
1.06 
 
0.90 
0.09 
(0.14) 
0.14 
(0.16) 
1.09 
 
0.87 
Educ 
 
lnsales  
+ 
 
+ 
 
- 0.07     
(0.06) 
0.21**    
(0.10) 
0.94 
 
1.24 
- 0.05 
(0.08) 
0.22 
(0.14) 
0.95 
 
1.24 
- 0.08 
(0.07) 
0.24** 
(0.13) 
0.92 
 
1.29 
expnd_d 
 
cash1 
 
gender 
+ 
 
- 
 
- 
 
0.88***    
(0.35) 
- 0.81**   
(0.34) 
0.45    
(0.41) 
2.41 
 
0.44 
 
1.57 
0.38 
(0.48) 
- 1.18*** 
(0.48) 
0.23 
(0.60) 
1.47 
 
0.31 
 
1.26 
0.25* 
(0.13) 
- 1.06** 
(0.46) 
0.44 
(0.52) 
2.08 
 
0.35 
 
1.56 
tash_obl 
 
fergh 
- 
 
- 
 
0.66*    
(0.40) 
- 0.25    
(0.49) 
1.94 
 
0.78 
1.05* 
(0.56) 
0.83 
(0.66) 
2.85 
 
2.30 
0.86 
(0.57) 
0.02 
(0.54) 
2.37 
 
0.98 
agri 
 
srvs 
 
trd 
 
+/- 
 
+/- 
 
+/- 
- 0.85    
(0.58) 
- 1.18**   
(0.51) 
0.23    
(0.47) 
0.43 
 
0.31 
 
1.26 
- 1.85*** 
(0.74) 
- 0.82 
(0.70) 
0.12 
(0.62) 
0.16 
 
0.44 
 
1.12 
- 1.09 
(0.77) 
- 0.38 
(0.60) 
0.33 
(0.62) 
0.34 
 
0.68 
 
1.39 
gov_connect 
 
Bribe 
 
bzinbrpl 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
0.84**    
(0.36) 
0.42 
(0.33) 
0.93** 
(0.41) 
2.33 
 
1.52 
 
2.55 
0.78 
(0.51) 
- 0.11 
(0.44) 
0.90 
(0.56) 
2.18 
 
0.90 
 
2.45 
0.85** 
(0.44) 
0.47 
(0.42) 
1.40** 
(0.62) 
2.34 
 
1.59 
 
4.06 
Overall Model Evaluation and Tests  
χ²(d.f.) 
 
χ²(d.f.) 
 
χ²(d.f.) 
Log-likelihood value 
Likelihood ratio test 
-143.38 
65.00 (17)*** 
- 75.80 
34.96 (17)*** 
-87.50 
39.68 (17)*** 
Pseudo R squared 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness-of-fit 
test 
0.19 
6.24 (8) 
0.19 
10.11 (8) 
0.19 
5.70 (8) 
Correctly predicted  
Number of Observations 
80.97% 
331 
69.63% 
135 
73.43% 
175 
Notes: Models estimated using Stata 11; *** refers to significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, and * significant 
at 10% levels respectively. Model 1 uses all available data from the full sample (general). Model 2 includes only 
observations conditional upon applying for credit (lower bound). Model 3 includes only observations 
conditional upon expressing need for credit (upper bound). 
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The three categorical variables, gov_connect, bribe, and bzinbrpl, attempt to capture the 
effect of interpersonal networks on the probability of obtaining formal credit. The main 
target variable is gov_connect, but the variables bribe and bzinbrpl might also be important 
in capturing interpersonal relations. But, it is important to note that bribes are more likely to 
occur when one does not have connections as mutual unpaid obligations will dominate when 
one has contacts. Still, people who have contacts may be introduced to others, with whom 
they have no contact, in which case bribe becomes appropriate and hence may serve as an 
(imperfect) substitute for contacts. Approximately 34% of sampled SMEs reported bribes to 
public officials in the past. Operating a business in one’s birth place could also improve the 
chances of developing interpersonal relations with bank officers as well as government 
officials, whereas this variable could also measure discrimination against migrant business 
owners. Around 23% of the SMEs in the sample do not operate in their owners’ birthplace, 
and the figure is slightly higher in the Tashkent city, around 30%. Consequently, positive 
signs are expected on the coefficients of all these three variables. 
Firstly, Model 1 is estimated using all available observations in the sample; missing values in 
some variables reduce the number of usable observations to 331. Estimated parameter 
values, and corresponding odds ratios, of this model are reported in the third and fourth 
columns of Table 4, and indicate that, with few exceptions, most have the expected signs and 
are statistically significant.5 Variables age and bsness_exper and their respective squared 
terms, and cash1 and lnsales have expected signs and are statistically significant at 5% level; 
expnd_d also has the anticipated sign and is statistically significant at the 1% level. The 
coefficient estimate of the Tashkent region dummy has the opposite sign but is only 
marginally significant; whereas although the sign of the Ferghana region dummy is consistent 
with the data, it is statistically insignificant. Of the sector dummy variables, only that for the 
services sector is significant at 5% level; its negative sign can perhaps be explained by the 
fact that the services sector is one of the least capital-intensive sectors. The interpersonal 
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network variables all have the expected signs. Estimated parameters of gov_connect and 
bzinbrpl are statistically significant at 5% level, implying that having interpersonal 
connections matters for SMEs in obtaining bank credit. In terms of odds ratios, the odds of 
success for gov_connect and bzinbrpl variables is 2.33 and 2.55 respectively. However, 
although the sign of the coefficient of bribe is consistent with the data, it is not statistically 
significant. To investigate this question in more depth, we also estimated various factors 
affecting the probability of offering bribe, which are reported in Appendix 2. These results 
indicate that smaller SMEs with inferior firm characteristics offer bribe more systematically, 
which could partly explain statistical insignificance of bribe in our estimations. This contrasts 
with the importance of gov_connect which seems to be more important for larger SMEs as 
further discussion below will show. In addition, it is also possible that bribe measures the 
evidence of bribing minor government officials, not bank officers, in the past, whereas 
gov_connect and bzinbrpl capture possible prior and current connections and relationships. 
In this sense, the variable bribe might not be a strong proxy for interpersonal connections 
that currently matter. Also, discrete nature of such exchanges indicate that they are likely to 
be carried out between unrelated parties, requiring only limited future commitment from 
either parties beyond specific transactions they are currently involved in. Further, there is a 
degree of possible overlap between the bribe and the government connections variables. 
Although they both may require some form of pecuniary reward in exchange for favours, 
interpersonal links such as government connections are the more valuable of the two, as 
they can be used repeatedly in future and may produce potentially continuous benefits to 
the parties involved in the network, including gaining access to bank credit which is not 
explicitly controlled by government officials. 
These preliminary estimation results pass basic diagnostic checks; for example, the likelihood 
ratio and the Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness-of-fit tests. Yet it is likely that the observed 
higher application and success rates for SMEs with government connections could be due to 
Connectedness and SME financing in post-communist economies: evidence from Uzbekistan 
Kobil Ruziev and Peter Midmore 
25 
 
self-selecting behaviour of the borrowers. Consequently, two alternative models with 
different sub-samples are estimated to deal with the issue. The first sub-sample is 
conditioned upon applying for formal finance, and the second conditioned upon expressing a 
need for external finance (Cavaluzzo et al., 2002; Blanchard et al., 2008; Muravyev et al., 
2009).  
One consideration is that because SMEs without government connections may be less 
optimistic about their chances of obtaining formal credit, they would be less likely to apply 
for a bank loan. As a result, although their share in the general pool of credit applicants 
would be lower, the proportion of SMEs with stronger creditworthiness characteristics 
amongst the applicants in this group would be higher, as they would be less likely to 
anticipate refusal, leading to the underestimation of the importance of having government 
connections (Cavalluzzo et al., 2002, p. 670; Blanchflower et al., 2003, p.930). 
As an alternative, successful applications for formal credit relative to SMEs with unmet credit 
needs could be examined, because that involves both self-excluded borrowers along with 
rejected applicants. Given that SMEs with government connections are more optimistic and 
are more likely to apply for a bank credit, this would lead to the overestimation of the 
importance of having government connections. Following Cavalluzzo et al. (2002) and 
Muravyev et al. (2009) we use both approaches to deal with this possible sample selection 
bias, respectively providing lower and upper bounds of prejudice against SMEs without 
government connections in gaining access to formal credit. 
Table 4 also reports estimation results for Model 2, which uses only a sub-sample of formal 
credit use, conditional upon applying for bank credit (a lower bound of prejudice), and Model 
3, which uses a slightly larger sub-sample of formal credit use, conditional upon expressing a 
need for external finance (an upper bound of prejudice). As expected, the coefficient 
estimate of the main target variable gov_connect is smaller in Model 2 (0.78) than in Model 3 
(0.85) and is significant at the 13% level in the former and the 5% level in the latter. In terms 
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of the odds ratio, everything else equal, this implies that the odds of receipt of formal credit 
for SMEs with government connections, compared to those without, increase from 2.18 in 
Model 2 to 2.34 in Model 3.  Similarly, the odds of success for bzinbrpl, which is statistically 
significant in all three models, increases from 2.45 in Model 2 to 4.06 in Model 3.  
Although the statistical and economic significance of gov_connect, a proxy variable for 
interpersonal relations, is suggestive of misallocation of scarce resources in the context of 
the social capital literature, equation (1) has been re-estimated for slightly different 
dependent variables to seek further empirical support for our argument. Results of these 
estimations, which are presented and discussed in Appendix 3, indicate that although having 
government connections improves SMEs’ access to formal credit, they are not necessarily 
associated with entrepreneurs’ ability to expand their businesses.  
We also carried out further checks for model specification and robustness of our results, 
including inspecting consistency of our main findings across various sub-samples. These, 
which are reported and discussed in detail in Appendix 4, also confirm that government 
connections matter, especially benefiting larger, longer-established, and wealthier 
enterprises. Moreover, the sensitivity analysis of the marginal effects of our target variables 
at various representative values of other important variables such as lnsales and cash1, 
which are discussed in more depth in Appendix 5, suggests that the impact of interpersonal 
connections is stronger for larger enterprises. For example, for an SME with government 
connections, the probability of obtaining formal finance increases from 13% to 17% when 
the value of lnsales moves from minus 1 s.d. to plus 1 s.d. from the mean value of the 
variable. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Interpersonal networks are often associated with improving market exchange and resource 
allocation (Dasgupta, 2005). In the area of development finance, for example, interpersonal 
relationships have been used positively in forming peer-monitoring-based microcredit 
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institutions which provide credit to individuals excluded from formal credit (Morduch, 1999; 
see also a study by Helliwell and Putnam, 2000). Nevertheless, Stiglitz (2001), Rose (2001), 
and Dasgupta (2009) all emphasise the importance of a balanced interaction of impersonal 
markets as well as bureaucratic institutions. Where markets are thin or suppressed, 
bureaucratic state institutions lack credibility, and rules and laws are dysfunctional, rent-
seeking behaviour may became prevalent as agents try to profit from the web of 
interpersonal relations. 
Post transition, market-based exchanges have intensified, and formal bureaucratic 
organisations have gained importance, in most post-communist economies like Uzbekistan. 
However, the latter still fail to operate impartially, predictably, and according to the rule of 
law. Under these circumstances, resource misallocation results where agents resort more 
frequently to interpersonal networks to personalise their relationships with impersonal 
bureaucrats to get things done.  
Our findings from a survey of SMEs in Uzbekistan seem to support this argument. The 
evidence shows that the proportion of SMEs expressing a need for external finance is lower 
for enterprises with government connection than their counterparts; but, conditional upon 
applying for formal credit, their success rate is higher than that of SMEs without government 
connections. On average, a larger proportion of SMEs with government connections 
obtained bank credit than those without government connections but, compared with the 
latter group, a smaller proportion of the former group had carried out business expansion 
since their inception. Various models estimating the probability of obtaining bank credit also 
show that SMEs with government connections are more than twice likely than those without 
to be in receipt of formal credit. In terms of marginal effects, having government 
connections improves the chances of obtaining formal finance by around 20%.  
The concept of unequal access to formal finance, widely discussed in the literature, refers to 
a disproportionately higher portion of resources being channelled to larger enterprises. Our 
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results show that, when the modern economic structure is not mature, even the smaller 
portion of formal finance left for SMEs can be distributed unequally; but in this case, a 
disproportionately higher portion of limited formal finance will be allocated to SMEs with 
interpersonal links to minor government officials and possibly with bank officers, with 
potential implications for resource allocation and growth.  
Since the later 1990s, policy making in this area in Uzbekistan has focused mainly on 
increasing the flow of formal finance to the SME sector, including funds attracted from 
international financial institutions (IFIs). For example, almost all commercial banks in the 
country have dedicated loan departments offering small business loans. These are financed 
from sources which include a compulsory 25% deduction from bank profits, targeted off-
budget government funds, and loans from IFIs; and for commercial banks, they are further 
incentivised by tax benefits for revenues generated by credit activities in this sector. Even if 
these policies were effective, which is debatable without appropriate empirical evidence, our 
findings make a strong case against the efficiency of their ultimate outcome. This suggests 
that policy-makers should be concerned not only about measures that facilitate increased 
availability of formal finance, but also, and more importantly, about longer-term 
improvements in capacity building. Explicitly, they should focus on establishing more 
transparent and efficient bureaucratic organisations whose impartial role is to ensure the 
rule of law. Otherwise, public officials in otherwise impersonal bureaucratic organisations 
will continue using rigidity of rules and regulations as an excuse for rent-seeking. Thus, 
entrepreneurs lose incentives to use prices, rules and regulations as signals, relying instead, 
where coincidentally possible, on interpersonal networks of relationships with bureaucrats, 
which results in misallocation of scarce credit resources. 
An important caveat, however, is that, despite passing various robustness checks, our 
findings confirm existence of a statistical correlation and not of a theoretical causation. For 
example, in a relevant and interesting paper, Li (1996, p.16) demonstrates that under 
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imperfect market conditions and limited rule of law, entrepreneurs may consciously and 
actively look for government connections hoping to gain access to resources and/or to ease 
various business constraints. This then could incentivise public officials either i) to increase 
complexity of regulations to gain more rents, hindering growth prospects, or ii) to make 
them feel de-facto stakeholders in businesses rather than “short-termist bribe-takers” (Li, 
1998, p.395), resulting in the adoption and implementation of business-friendly regulations, 
hence fostering growth prospects. Frye and Shleifer (1997) make a strong case for the 
former, a ‘grabbing hand’, version of the argument in the context of the Russian experience 
while Li (1998) makes a strong case for the latter, a “helping hand”, version in the context of 
the Chinese experience. But, Li (1998) also emphasises that the “helping hand” version is 
specific only to China due to its administrative reforms which, by granting permissions 
allowing bureaucrats to quit bureaucracy and join the business sector, incentivised the 
bureaucrats to implement pro-growth reforms.6 
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Endnotes 
 
1. Social capital is more extensive than interpersonal networks (Fedderke et al., 1999), but, according 
to Dasgupta (2005, p.S10) the leaner definition provided here is better suited for study of the 
potentially conflicting roles of social capital in economic processes. 
2. Each index ranges from 1 to 4.33, where 1 represents no or little change from a centrally planned 
economy and 4.33 represents a standard typical of an industrialised market economy. Further 
information can be found in EBRD (2000). 
3. Restrictions imposed by monetary authorities limit the amount of cash that can be withdrawn from 
commercial banks’ accounts with the central bank, despite having sufficient balances. This cash money 
squeeze has led to a discounted exchange rate for non-cash money, on average requiring a premium 
of 8-10% to convert to cash in Tashkent, and a lot more in the provinces (Ruziev and Midmore, 2014). 
4. Representativeness of female entrepreneurs in the SME sample and possible measurement errors 
are discussed in Appendix 4. 
5. Since our sample size is relatively small, we use 10% as a borderline significance level.  
6. “That is, an incumbent bureaucrat must establish a pro-business and pro-reform reputation to find 
a good position in the local business community after leaving the government. The best way to 
enhance this reputation is to promote growth and reform and to nurture personal rapport with local 
entrepreneurs by helping their businesses to thrive” Li (1998, p. 396). 
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APPENDICES: 
Appendix 1  
Data Source and Construction 
Table A1 shows how per capita output varies in the fourteen administrative regions in 
Uzbekistan. The city of Tashkent is the most prosperous administrative region, with per 
capita output more than two and a half times higher than the national average; the only 
other region that enjoys similar levels of prosperity is Navoiy, with its concentration of the 
country’s largest gold mining corporations.  
Table A1. Distribution of National Output Across Regions in Uzbekistan, 2010. 
  
Annual Output, 
Billion Soums 
Population, 
Million (2009) 
Output per Capita, 
Thousand Soums 
Karakalpakstan 1389.8 1.62 856.26 
Namangan 2426.6 2.24 1084.22 
Surkhandarya 2229.3 2.05 1085.13 
Samarkand 3813.1 3.09 1233.73 
Djizhak 1389.1 1.11 1253.93 
Khorezm 1944.1 1.55 1257.34 
Ferghana 4095.5 3.05 1343.36 
Syrdarya 1008.3 0.71 1423.35 
Andizhan 3679.6 2.52 1457.50 
Kashkadarya 4865.1 2.59 1878.71 
Bukhara 3376.0 1.60 2109.08 
Tashkent Region 5571.1 2.57 2168.76 
Navoiy 3276.6 0.85 3876.26 
City of Tashkent 9820.1 2.22 4422.07 
Uzbekistan 48884.3 27.77 1760.51 
Source: Statistical Review of the Republic of Uzbekistan (2010) 
 
To capture any possible differences in business environments which may influence 
enterprises’ access to and use of formal finance, the primary data sample of 502 SMEs is 
drawn from the core capital city region (301 observations) and two other regions, the 
Tashkent region (101 observations)  and the Ferghana region (100 observations). Self-
employed private entrepreneurs, enterprises providing financial services, and enterprises 
with more than 100 employees were excluded from the sample. 
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Use of the State Register of Enterprises and Organisations as a sampling source was 
impractical because of the infrequency of its updating, so it was impossible to ascertain 
whether some of the listed enterprises had moved premises or had gone out of business. 
Instead, the sample was drawn from local business directories, using a stratified random 
sampling approach. To obtain representative samples from each sector of the economy we 
chose 40% of the observations from the manufacturing and construction sectors, 30% from 
the services sector, 20% from the trade sector, and 10% from the agricultural sector. 
Agriculture was accorded a lower weighting because production quotas, price controls, and 
subsidised credits are still common in the sector, and it remains one of the least reformed 
parts of the economy (Lerman, 2008). The survey questionnaire was piloted in November 
2010 and, after making appropriate modifications, the full survey was carried out in 
December 2010 using face-to-face interviews, with 20% of the respondents contacted by 
telephone later on for quality control purposes. 
Appendix 2 
Bribe Models 
Table A2 shows the results of models estimating the probability of offering bribe for the full 
sample (Model 4) and a sub-sample conditional upon applying for formal credit (Model 5). 
Focussing on Model 5, coefficients of the variables age, age22, educ, cash1, and expnd_d are 
all statistically significant. As for the interpretation of the signs of these variables, the results 
imply that: youngest and oldest SME owners, better educated SME owners, and SMEs facing 
payments system problems are more likely to bribe the officials; and the probability of 
offering bribe falls as sales revenues (expnd_d) increases. These, combined with the fact 
that, although insignificant, lnsales also has a negative sign, imply that firm size and superior 
firm characteristics reduce probability of offering bribe to public officials. Further, with 
respect to cash1, it is more practical for larger SMEs to effect most of their input and wage 
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payments, and also get paid for their outputs, through their bank accounts. In other words, 
since it is the smaller SMEs which face payments problems the most, the observed positive 
sign of cash1 re-enforces our conclusion about the importance of firm size. Hence, these 
results shed further light as to why the bribe variable might be insignificant in our main 
estimations (although this does not seem to deter the sampled SMEs from enthusiastically 
applying for formal credit as evidenced by the statistical significance of bribe in the credit 
application model as shown in Model 6 in Table A2). 
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Table A2. Probability of Offering Bribe and Applying for Formal Finance  
(Logit Coefficients with Standard Errors) 
Predictors  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Constant 1.48 
(2.26) 
7.63 
(4.7) 
- 7.37*** 
(2.50) 
Age 
 
age22 
- 0.09 
(0.08) 
0.08 
(0.09) 
- 0.36* 
(0.19) 
0.40* 
(0.22) 
0.20** 
(0.09) 
- 0.25** 
(0.11) 
busness_exper 
 
busness_exper22 
0.002 
(0.03) 
0.008 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
- 0.07 
(0.04) 
Educ 
 
lnsales  
0.05 
(0.05) 
- 0.02 
(0.08) 
0.12** 
(0.07) 
- 0.13 
(0.14) 
- 0.05 
(0.04) 
0.16** 
(0.08) 
expnd_d 
 
cash1 
 
gender 
- 0.37 
(0.25) 
0.56** 
(0.27) 
0.39 
(0.34) 
- 0.93** 
(0.45) 
1.19*** 
(0.45) 
0.72 
(0.56) 
0.88*** 
(0.28) 
- 0.07 
(0.28) 
0.27 
(0.35) 
tash_obl 
 
fergh 
- 0.05 
(0.33) 
- 1.46*** 
(0.40) 
0.03 
(0.53) 
- 0.73 
(0.64) 
0.01 
(0.34) 
- 0.78** 
(0.39) 
agri 
 
srvs 
 
trd 
 
0.28 
(0.47) 
- 0.18 
(0.36) 
- 0.49 
(0.41) 
-0.46 
(0.71) 
0.19 
(0.68) 
- 0.81 
(0.61) 
0.22 
(0.45) 
- 0.94*** 
(0.38) 
0.36 
(0.39) 
gov_connect 
 
Bribe 
 
bzinbrpl 
 
0.01 
(0.31) 
_ 
 
- 0.17 
(0.30) 
- 0.28 
(0.48) 
_ 
 
0.03 
(0.53) 
0.61** 
(0.30) 
0.61** 
(0.27) 
0.53* 
(0.32) 
Overall Model Evaluation and Tests    
 χ²(d.f.) χ²(d.f.) χ²(d.f.) 
Log-likelihood value 
Likelihood ratio test 
- 199.65 
33.97*** 
-80.40 
24.78*** 
-197.78 
53.80*** 
Pseudo R squared 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness-of-fit test 
0.08 
3.12 (8) 
0.13 
7.78 (8) 
0.12 
5.14 (8) 
Correctly predicted  
Number of Observations 
67.80% 
332 
68.38% 
136 
68.07% 
332 
Notes: Models estimated using Stata 11; coefficient standard errors are reported in brackets; *** 
refers to significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, and * significant at 10% levels respectively. In Models 4 
and 5, the dependant variable takes the value of 1 if SME senior manager ever offered bribe to 
government officials to get things done, 0 otherwise;  Model 5 includes observations conditional upon 
applying for credit only. In Model 6, the dependant variable takes the value 1 is SMEs applied for 
formal finance, 0 otherwise. 
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Appendix 3 
Models for Business Expansion 
Results of the models for business expansion are reported in Table A3 below. In Model 7 and 
Model 8, the dependent variable takes the value of 1 if SMEs expressed a need for external 
finance, which is used here as a proxy for enterprises’ growth potential, and 0 otherwise: 
Model 7 uses all available observations, while Model 8 uses observations conditional upon 
SMEs undertaking business expansion since their inception. The dependent variable in Model 
9 takes the value of 1 if SMEs undertook investment in business expansion since their 
inception, 0 otherwise. Of the three proxies for interpersonal connections, only the 
coefficient of bzinbrpl is statistically significant in all three models. The main target variable 
gov_connect has the expected positive sign in all three models, but is not statistically 
significant in any of them.  
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Table A3. Probability of Undertaking Business Expansion and Needing Formal Finance 
(Logit Coefficients with Standard Errors) 
Predictors  Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
Constant - 2.73 
(2.22) 
- 1.98 
(2.75) 
- 6.40 
(2.51) 
Age 
 
age22 
0.13 
(0.08) 
- 0.15 
(0.09) 
0.11 
(0.10) 
-0.14 
(0.11) 
0.08 
(0.09) 
- 0.08 
(0.09) 
busness_exper 
 
busness_exper22 
0.02 
(0.03) 
- 0.08 
(0.06) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
- 0.10 
(0.09) 
0.04 
(0.05) 
- 0.04 
(0.05) 
Educ 
 
lnsales  
- 0.01 
(0.04) 
 0.01 
(0.08) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
- 0.02 
(0.10) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
0.24*** 
(0.10) 
expnd_d 
 
cash1 
 
gender 
 
invstd 
- 0.31 
(0.25) 
0.46* 
(0.26) 
0.20 
(0.32) 
0.48* 
(0.28) 
- 0.56* 
(0.31) 
0.40 
(0.33) 
0.47 
(0.40) 
–  
 
0.41 
(0.29) 
0.45 
(0.30) 
- 0.06 
(0.37) 
–  
 
tash_obl 
 
fergh 
- 0.65** 
(0.33) 
0.19 
(0.36) 
- 0.50 
(0.39) 
0.57 
(0.46) 
1.02** 
(0.42) 
0.40 
(0.40) 
Agri 
 
srvs 
 
trd 
 
- 0.28 
(0.44) 
- 0.64* 
(0.35) 
0.07 
(0.39) 
- 0.18 
(0.53) 
- 0.87 
(0.42) 
- 0.19 
(0.51) 
- 0.42 
(0.51) 
0.10 
(0.39) 
- 0.82** 
(0.41) 
gov_connect 
 
bribe 
 
bzinbrpl 
 
0.14 
(0.29) 
0.25 
(0.26) 
0.56* 
(0.30) 
0.21 
(0.35) 
0.40 
(0.31) 
0.88** 
(0.37) 
0.31 
(0.35) 
0.48 
(0.30) 
0.64* 
(0.35) 
Overall Model Evaluation and Tests    
 χ²(d.f.) χ²(d.f.) χ²(d.f.) 
Log-likelihood value 
Likelihood ratio test 
-211.80 
35.44(18)*** 
-147.32 
38.77(17)*** 
- 172.75 
40.51(17)*** 
Pseudo R squared 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Goodness-of-fit test 
0.08 
6.45 (8) 
0.12 
5.54 (8) 
0.11 
3.97 (8) 
Correctly predicted  
Number of Observations 
62.35% 
332 
64.61% 
243 
73.49% 
332 
Notes: Models estimated using Stata 11; coefficient standard errors are reported in brackets; *** 
refers to significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, and * significant at 10% levels respectively. In Models 7 
and 8, the dependant variable takes the value of 1 if SMEs express need for external finance, 0 
otherwise; Model 7 includes all of the available observations in the sample; Model 8 uses only 
observations if SMEs undertook business expansion.  In Model 9, the dependant variable takes the 
value 1 is SMEs invested in business expansion, 0 otherwise. 
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Appendix 4 
Further Checks for Model Specification and Robustness of the Results 
An alternative approach for dealing with the self-selection issue, particularly when 
conditional sub-samples cannot be drawn, is to use more sophisticated maximum likelihood 
estimators such as the Heckman-type probit model. This estimates the credit use and credit 
application equations jointly, also assuming the joint normality of their error terms and non-
zero correlation (ρ) between them (Cavaluzzo et al. 2002; Cavaluzzo and Cavaluzzo, 1998). If 
the latter condition is not satisfied, i.e. ρ=0, the results from general models are considered 
unbiased and consistent (Wooldridge, 2002). However, estimation of this model requires 
identification of a variable which affects the probability of credit application in the selection 
model, but does not belong to the main of model credit use in its own right. Unfortunately 
the choice of instruments available for this variable in our dataset is limited. The most 
promising variable is the response to the question about ‘low demand for products’, which 
could be interpreted as a measure of overconfidence (or risk aversion): we conjecture that, 
due to asymmetric information problems, banks’ knowledge of the actual nature of market 
demand for enterprises’ products is always less than that of the borrowers. Since most 
enterprises suffering from low demand for their products will select themselves out from 
applying for formal credit, enterprises that suffer more from low demand for their products 
but still apply for formal credit can be described as overconfident if they are unconcerned 
about the possibility that banks may find this out. For example, 187 enterprises in the sample 
complained of low demand for their products being 'important' or 'very important' problem, 
but 54 of these still applied for formal credit. Although the smaller proportion of these SMEs 
applied for formal credit (29% compared to 42% of the counterpart group), more than half of 
them were not detected by banks. Hence the variable, coded 1 if enterprises reported this 
factor as an ‘important’ or ‘very important’ obstacle to the operation and growth of their 
businesses, and 0 otherwise was included in the credit application part of the model. The 
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results of the model, which are reported in Table A4.1 show that the coefficient of the target 
variable gov_connect and that of bzinbrpl are statistically significant at 5% level. Although the 
instrumental variable in the selection equation is statistically significant at around 2%, and 
the null hypothesis of 'no systematic difference between the coefficients of general and 
Heckman models' (the Hausman test) is also rejected at less than 1% level of significance, the 
correlation coefficient between the error terms of the main and selection equations is 
statistically significant only at 13%. Nevertheless, the results from the Heckman model are 
not fundamentally different from those obtained using univariate models. For example, once 
converted into logit coefficient using rough guides, e.g. 0.54x1.6=0.86 (from which an odds 
ratio of 2.37 can also be derived), the estimated magnitude of the gov_connect coefficient is 
also comparable to those obtained in logit models in Table 4 in the main text. Incidentally, 
this observation is in line with the findings of Cavalluzzo et al. (2002) and Muravyev et al. 
(2009) who, despite having a somewhat richer dataset, did not find fundamentally different 
results in their estimations of Heckman-type models. The findings, however, are not 
suggestive of the absence of selection problems as the similarity of the estimates with and 
without selection correction may also be the result of statistical problems (Kennedy, 2003, 
p.291; Wooldridge, 2006, pp. 609-11) and/or because the instrument of our choice is not 
strong enough. 
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Table A4.1. Credit Use: Probability of Holding a Formal Credit (Heckprobit Coefficients with Standard 
Errors)  
Predictors  Main Model: 
Credit Use 
Selection Model: 
Credit Application  
 
Constant - 6.21*** 
(2.26) 
- 4.23*** 
(1.48) 
 
Age 
 
age22 
0.15* 
(0.09) 
- 0.17* 
(0.11) 
0.13** 
(0.06) 
- 0.15** 
(0.07) 
 
busness_exper 
 
busness_exper22 
0.04* 
(0.02) 
- 0.07* 
(0.04) 
0.03* 
(0.02) 
- 0.05* 
(0.03) 
 
Educ 
 
lnsales  
- 0.04 
(0.04) 
0.13* 
(0.07) 
- 0.02 
(0.03) 
0.08* 
(0.05) 
 
expnd_d 
 
cash1 
 
gender 
 
0.48** 
(0.23) 
- 0.52** 
(0.26) 
0.18 
(0.27) 
 0.49*** 
(0.17) 
- 0.05 
(0.17) 
0.17 
(0.21) 
 
tash_obl 
 
fergh 
0.47 
(0.30) 
0.07 
(0.36) 
0.08 
(0.21) 
- 0.36 
(0.24) 
 
Agri 
 
srvs 
 
trd 
 
- 0.74* 
(0.45) 
- 0.73** 
(0.32) 
0.14 
(0.29) 
- 0.02 
(0.28) 
- 0.54** 
(0.23) 
0.17 
(0.24) 
 
gov_connect 
 
bribe 
 
bzinbrpl 
 
lw_dmd_dum 
 
0.54** 
(0.24) 
0.18 
(0.22) 
0.52* 
(0.26) 
_ 
0.36* 
(0.18) 
0.39*** 
(0.16) 
0.33** 
(0.20) 
- 0.36** 
(0.15) 
 
Likelihood ratio test of the independence of equations (ρ=0) 
 
Heckman test for the absence of systematic difference between 
the coefficients of univariate and bivariate models 
χ²(d.f.) 
2.68 (1) 
 
62.63 (17)*** 
Overall Model Evaluation and Tests χ² (d.f.) 
Log-likelihood value 
Likelihood ratio test 
-269.52 
35.05 (17)*** 
331 Number of Observations 
Notes: Models estimated using Stata 11; coefficient standard errors are reported in brackets; *** 
refers to significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, and * significant at 10% levels respectively.  
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The missing variable problem is another issue which may affect results, particularly 
differences in the creditworthiness of enterprises, including detailed data on entrepreneurs’ 
personal wealth. Banks usually require carefully drafted business plans and feasibility studies 
from SMEs when considering their loan applications, along with historic financial 
performance indicators. They also consider the personal wealth of business owners which 
can be drawn upon should the company finances deteriorate significantly. Variables already 
included, such as owner age, business experience and education will capture at least some of 
the features of creditworthiness, personal wealth, and entrepreneurial drive and skill. But, 
incomplete characterisation of these factors may still have potential impact on our results. 
There is also a possible measurement error with the gender term, which is statistically 
insignificant and has a counter-intuitive positive sign in Models 1, 2, and 3. Some studies 
investigating gender discrimination in SME finance such as Cavaluzzo et al. (2002) and 
Muravyev et al. (2009, see also Blanchard et al., 2008) show that Models 2 and 3 can deal 
with negative discrimination and positive selection effects with respect to the gender term 
by providing the upper and lower bounds of gender discrimination, which both papers find 
to be negative and statistically significant in relation to the US and International SME finance 
data respectively. In our view, the gender term may be insignificant in our estimation due to 
a lack of credibility of bureaucratic institutions in protecting private property rights. Because 
of a fear of possible misappropriation, Uzbek businessmen are known to commonly register 
titles of their high value properties such houses, cars, and sometimes even their businesses, 
in the name of their close relatives, these often being female. Hence, the insignificance of 
the gender term may not necessarily indicate absence of gender discrimination as the 
sample of female SME owners used in this study may not be fully representative of the 
female entrepreneurs in the SME population.  
Consequently, the approach proposed by Blanchflower et al. (2003) and Muravyev et al. 
(2009) of carrying out several further regression estimations on various sub-samples is used. 
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First, the sample is divided according to enterprise size and age, respectively. Larger and 
more established enterprises are likely to rely on businesses’ rather than owners’ resources 
to repay obligations. In terms of enterprise size, two sub-samples are identified; SMEs with 
less than 10 employees and those with more than 10 employees, respectively. As for SME 
age, the first sub-sample includes SMEs established less than four years ago, with the rest of 
the available observations in the second sub-sample. Second, the dataset contains a variable 
which measures respondents’ subjective evaluation of their access to bank credit from 1 to 
5: 1 being very easy and 5 very difficult. Since wealthier business owners are less likely to be 
constrained by lack of external finance, they are also less likely to complain about access to 
bank credit. Therefore, again the data is split into two sub-samples: the first sub-sample 
contains SMEs with ‘very easy’ and ‘easy’ responses, and the second contains the rest.  
The estimation results from these sub-samples are reported in Table A4.2. Models 1, 2, and 3 
in Table A4.2 are identical to those reported in Table 4 in the main text; for brevity, only 
results of the main target variable gov_connect, are reported. This shows that the sign of the 
government connections variable is correctly predicted in all estimations. The magnitudes of 
the coefficients are not radically different in most of the estimations, with the exception of 
Model 2 in Panel A and Panel C. It is possible that some of the observed differences might 
also be due unintentional loss of observations because of missing data, especially in relation 
to Models 2 and 3 which already use restricted number of observations conditional, 
respectively, upon application for credit, and expressing the need for credit. In general, 
parameter estimates of the sub-samples for larger, longer-established, and wealthier 
enterprises appear to be greater. 
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Table A4.2. Probability of Holding Formal Credit: Estimation Results from Sub-samples 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Panel A. Enterprise size sub-samples 
  
More than 10 
employees 
Less than 10 
employees 
More than 10 
employees 
Less than 10 
employees 
More than 10 
employees 
Less than 10 
employees 
gov_connect 
0.996* 
(0.573) 
0.543 
(0.551) 
0.064 
(0.951) 
1.570 
(0.989) 
0.835 
(0.747) 
0.615 
(0.735) 
N. Obs. 135 196 67 68 72 92 
Panel B. Enterprise age sub-samples 
  
5 years or 
above 
4 years or 
under 
5 years or 
above 
4 years or 
under 
5 years or 
above 
4 years or 
under 
gov_connect 
1.243*** 
(0.502) 
1.061 
(0.667) 
1.096 
(0.705) 
0.932 
(1.171) 
1.205** 
(0.622) 
0.808 
(0.953) 
N. Obs. 182 149 53 82 97 78 
Panel C. Access to financing sub-samples 
  
Access  
Easy 
Access 
Difficult 
Access  
Easy 
Access 
Difficult 
Access  
Easy 
Access 
Difficult 
gov_connect 
1.000 
(0.878) 
0.562 
(0.468) - 
0.765 
(0.631) 
1.371 
(1.330) 
0.496 
(0.548) 
N. Obs. 64 244 16 94 34 141 
Notes: Models 1, 2, and 3 are identical to those reported in Table 4 in the main text; for brevity, only the results 
of the target variable, government connections, are reported. Panel A reports the estimates from sub-samples 
split on the basis of enterprise size, Panel B from sub-samples split on the basis of enterprise age. For Panel C, 
the sample is split on the basis of enterprises’ subjective evaluation of their access to formal finance. No result is 
reported for Model 2 in Panel C under ‘Access Easy’ due to low number of observations.  
*** refers to significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, and * significant at 10% levels respectively.  
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Appendix 5 
Sensitivity of Marginal Effects of Main Target Variables  
Table A5.1 presents marginal effects of our two key target variables, gov_connect and 
bzinbrpl, using Marginal Effects at Means (MEMs) and Average Marginal Effects (AMEs) 
methods. Given relative consistency of our results across various models, the model we 
choose here is the probability of holding formal credit conditional upon expressing  need for 
external finance (Model 3). Using the MEMs method, the results show that for an "average" 
SME with government connections, the probability of obtaining formal credit is 18% higher 
than that for a similar SME with no government connections. And, for an "average" SME that 
operates at its owner's birthplace, the probability of obtaining formal credit is 21% higher. 
But, the drawback of the MEMs approach is that while there can be an SME surviving in 
business for 7.86 years, and whose owner is 42.09 years old, there can be no SME with 
gov_connect at 0.25 (figures are the mean values of these variables respectively). This issue 
can be dealt with by using the AMEs approach which uses the actual observed values for the 
dummy variables for the entire sample when computing a predicted probability for each 
observation, and then averages the predicted values. The method in eﬀect compares two 
hypothetical populations which have the same values on the other independent variables in 
the model (Williams, 2012, p.323). As can be seen from the fourth column of Table A5.1, the 
AME methods produces results which are only marginally different from those reported 
using the MEM approach in the second column of Table A5.1.  
Table A5.1. Marginal Effects of Gov_connect and Bzinbrpl using Marginal 
Effects at Means (MEMs) and Average Marginal Affects Methods. 
  
MEMs AMEs 
Marginal 
Effects 
p-value Marginal 
Effects 
p-
value 
Gov_connect 0.18 0.07 0.15 0.06 
Bzinbrpl 0.21 0.00 0.20 0.00 
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But, since all the data, not just the means, are used in the calculation of marginal effects, 
even the AMEs is not free from criticism (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). So, to complement the 
shortcomings of the MEMs and AMEs methods, we also check the sensitivity of our main 
results using representative values of two key covariates, i.e. lnsales (proxy for SME size) and 
cash1 (proxy for cash/payment system problems). These results are reported in Tables A5.2 
and A5.3. The results from Table A5.2 indicate how much the marginal impact of -
gov_connect and bzinplbr on holding formal credit changes when the values of lnsales move 
one standard deviation (s.d.) from its mean value. Results show that magnitude of marginal 
effects of both variables increases as the values of lnsales go up, confirming our earlier 
observation that the importance of interpersonal connections strengthens as the size of the 
SMEs increases. In other words, interpersonal connections become increasingly important as 
the enterprise size gets larger. Table A5.3 adds another piece of useful information to this 
analysis. It shows that payment system problems (cash1=1) are less important for larger 
SMEs. For example, as can be seen from Column 6 in Panel I of Table A5.3, if an SME with 
government connections that is minus 1 s.d. from the mean lnsales value, is facing payments 
system (cash) issues, this will reduce the importance of having government connectedness 
by 5%. However, for an SME with similar attributes, but with plus 1 s.d. from the mean 
lnsales value, this difference is only 1%. And a similar trend is observed for bzinplbr, which 
can be seen in Panel II of Table A5.3. These results also indicate that, given payment system 
problems, interpersonal connections become increasingly important as the size of SMEs 
increases.  
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Table A5.3. Marginal Effects of Gov_connect and Bzinbrpl Given Representative Values of 
Lnsales and Cash1 Variables. 
Panel I. Gov_connect 
Representative Values of 
Lnsales: 
Cash1 = 1 Cash1 = 0   
Marginal 
Effects 
 
p-value Marginal 
Effects 
 
p-value 
Difference 
between the 
two M.E.s 
Minus 1 s.d. from the mean 0.12 0.09 0.17 0.06 0.05 
Mean 0.15 0.07 0.18 0.05 0.03 
Plus 1 s.d. from the mean 0.17 0.06 0.18 0.04 0.01 
Panel II. Bzinbrpl 
Representative Values of 
Lnsales: 
Cash1=1 Cash1=0   
Marginal 
Effects 
 
p-value 
Marginal 
Effects 
 
p-value 
Difference 
between the 
two M.E.s 
Minus 1 s.d. from the mean 0.13 0.01 0.23 0.01 0.10 
Mean 0.18 0.00 0.27 0.01 0.09 
Plus 1 s.d. from the mean 0.22 0.00 0.29 0.01 0.07 
 
 
Table A5.2. Marginal Effects of Gov_connect and Bzinbrpl Given 
Representative Values of Lnsales. 
Representative Values of 
Lnsales: 
Gov_connect Bzinbrpl 
Marginal 
Effects 
p-value Marginal 
Effects 
p-value 
Minus 1 s.d. from the mean 0.13 0.07  0.16 0.01  
Mean 0.16 0.06  0.20 0.00  
Plus 1 s.d. from the mean 0.17  0.05  0.24 0.01  
 
